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BOOK REVIEW
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION. By Lenore J. Weitzman. The Free Press,
1985.
Stanley Elliot Tobin*
In 1985, the Free Press published The Divorce Revolution, by Lenore J.
Weitzman, Ph.D. (Sociology), a culmination of the author's writing on the sub-
ject. The title is a misnomer; "The Divorce Convolution" would better describe
Weitzman's thesis. Basically, the book iterates and reiterates that "no-fault"
divorce legislation, led by California in 1970, is a noble experiment which like
the eighteenth amendment is fatally flawed.1 Its unintended consequences are so
financially damaging to women, Weitzman asserts, that major and drastic legis-
lation must be enacted to bring about or bring back "equity."
Not surprisingly, The Divorce Revolution was greeted with delight and ku-
dos by countless commentators. Feminist Betty Friedan proclaimed it an "ex-
tremely important book that reveals how the illusion of equality under current
divorce laws is imposing devastating and unfair hardships on women and chil-
dren." 2 Less lyrical and somewhat more critical treatment came from other
quarters. James Cook, president of the Joint Custody Association, asserts that
what Weitzman really seeks is a redistribution of wealth from one sex to the
other, without waiting for death, the historical leveler. "The implication is that
toleration of a spouse isn't necessary. You can have it now, rather than later.
Divorce is the procedure. The legal profession is the transfer agent.",
3
* Partner, Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Los Angeles, California. B.A. 1953, Harvard College;
LL.B. 1958, Yale Law School. Mr. Tobin was a Teaching Fellow (1958-59) and Visiting Lec-
turer in labor law (1976) at Stanford Law School.
1. The author does not take issue with Ms. Weitzman's views on child support and child
custody.
2. L. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985) (quote from book jacket). In an-
other quote from the book jacket, Diane Richmond, Chair, California State Bar, Family Law
Section, tabs the book "[p]rovocative and thoughtful... It is must reading for anyone con-
cerned with the future of marriage and divorce in this country." Barbara Williamson, an
English teacher, called the book "rigorously documented and gracefully written"; that Weitz-
man has proven with her "wide knowledge and sensitive understanding of her topic" that no-
fault, no consent divorce has "weakened marriage" and "worsened women's condition." Wil-
liamson, Victims of Reform (Book Review), N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, (book review section)
at 39, col. 1.
3. Cook, The Divorce Revolution (Book Review), L.A. Times, Nov. 17, 1985, (book re-
view section) at 2, col. 3. Recognizing that Weitzman has probably inflamed the ever-lasting
embers of the war between the sexes, Cook asserts that Weitzman "seeks government sanction
for a greater future economic security for the divorcing public, largely by one party at the
expense of the other, than our social system has been able to assure for those who remain
married." Id. at 11, col. 4. He calls for something other than an "early polemic," something
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This much about divorce both "sides" agree: women (as a general rule) and
children (almost invariably) suffer in many ways as a result of divorce, not the
least of which is financially. And more often than not, men suffer less financially
than women. All that is a "given." To this recognized problem, Weitzman has
a ready, easy solution: redefine the term "property" to permit divorce settle-
ments that overwhelmingly favor women.
The Divorce Revolution is Ph.D. poppycock. But can Weitzman be dis-
missed on the assumption that her camouflaged persiflage is of no major import
and that her grand following is to be expected? Can her proposals be considered
a nightmare, that with a new dawn will go away? Unfortunately, that dream
road is a dead end for almost everyone. Weitzman cannot be ignored. Because
her writing is not openly shrill, seldom strident and has the patina of scholar-
ship, she can well grab the brass ring. Her book, therefore, is as dangerous as it
is disingenuous.
It is dangerous because from such drivel come laws. Already, women have
been told that The Divorce Revolution is a "good handbook" to learn about their
rights.4 More significantly, a bill is now pending before the California Legisla-
ture that would make some of her less "off the wall" ideas the law in California.
5
Already afforded an opening wedge, her claims and aims, therefore, require fur-
ther analysis.
First, what does she want? Just about the most radical change in both di-
vorce and property law in Anglo-Saxon annals. She proposes that spouses be
able to obtain divorces without having to prove fault-as is the present law.
other than Weitzman's "gotcha" book: "there have to be better ways to ensure the economic
security of women than the way that turns divorce into extortion." Id., col. 5.
Hugh McIsaac, Director Family Court Services/Conciliation Court, Los Angeles County
Superior Court, wrote that Weitzman's "point of view fails to deal with the new realities we
face and attempts to return to a simpler time" and that Weitzman's proposals would result in a
"return to a dubious, romanticized past." McIsaac, The Divorce Revolution: A Critique, 10
CAL. FAM. L. REP. 3069, 3069-70 (1986). "Weitzman's approach would return us to the
polarized, adversary relationship between men and women; she fails to explore divorce within
a context that includes all members of the family or to consider a range of solutions that
transcends sexual politics." Id. at 3072. Weitzman "identifies the right problem, but proposes
some solutions that would merely trade one evil for another." Id. "We need thoughtful, care-
ful research, not narrow advocacy that plays parents against each other like scorpions in a
bottle." Id.
4. Blair, Women Who Divorce: Are They Getting a Fair Deal?, WOMAN'S DAY, May 27,
1986, at 4445.
5. S.B. 1750, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (as amended May 5, 1986) (Legislative Counsel's Di-
gest). California Senate Bill 1750 proposes amending section 4800.7 of the California Civil
Code to require the court, in certain cases, to defer the sale of the family home to achieve equal
division of the community property. Under the bill, the court must defer such a sale when the
economic, emotional, and social impact on the children is not outweighed by the economic
detriment to the noncustodial parent. As originally written, the bill would have allowed the
court to assign the family home to a spouse if, among other things, the parties had been mar-
ried at least 20 years, the spouse receiving the home is at least 50 years old, and that spouse has
"minimal" earning capacity. Id. Fortunately, this last provision was stricken from the bill.
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However, her plan requires the courts to treat the husband as though he were at
fault so that the "property" can be divided unequally between the parties, al-
lowing more than half of the community property to be awarded to the wife.
This, she claims, will help achieve "equity." If that sounds strange, Orwell
would understand.
But Weitzman's script has an additive feat. Taking "more" (or even every-
thing) from the husband may not give the wife "equity." The concept of "prop-
erty" must, therefore, be expanded, and once expanded, expropriated in favor of
the wife to help produce "just compensation." The husband need "only" pay, in
addition to alimony, the value of his future worth-his future earnings-re-
duced to its present value, which will be treated as though it were community
property. The husband must, at the time of the divorce, turn over whatever part
of that "property" a judge, aided (or compelled) by Weitzman's criteria, finds
appropriate. Mr. Orwell meet Mr. Kafka.
Weitzman's reviewers who write that her book is "gracefully written" and
that it reflects "sensitive understanding" must have read a different book. There
is no question that for almost 500 pages she shows compassion and empathy for
women. From the beginning (her dedication of the book to her mother) to the
peroration in her conclusion, she portrays the plight of women, quoting their
trials in vivid terms. One has the feeling of reading a modem-day version of a
Victorian melodrama where one is supposed to hiss the villain and cheer on the
heroine.
6
But nary a single sentence or a sympathetic word about men-any of them.
Why not? For the most part they hardly exist except as a source of income.
When Weitzman does bring them from some inanimate state to life, men are
usually depicted in the role of bete noir. She appears to divide society into saints
and sinners; and men, quite simply, are not saints. Weitzman does not engage in
an open diatribe against men; they do not seem to be worthy of any such sus-
tained emotion. So much for her graciousness and sensitivity.
The foremost assumptions in Weitzman's thesis are unstated. Men, she
avers, when married, made two promises and it must be assumed in a divorce
situation they have broken the first promise and so they must at least be made to
comply with the second promise. On the other hand, women only make one
promise; and it must be assumed they have fulfilled it. What are these mutual
covenants?
In entering into historical marriage, the "rules of the game" required each
spouse to fulfill the promises each made to the other (and implicitly to society).
The husband promised to love, honor, respect and support the wife. The wife
6. Indeed, in a review of Phyllis Gillis' book, Days Like This, Barbara Ehrenreich, in a
familiar vein, extols Gillis' personal account and tale of her divorce. Ehrenreich states that
Gillis' tragic situation follows the "general pattern" of divorce that Weitzman so poignantly
depicts in The Divorce Revolution. Ehrenreich, No-Faulk No Fair (Book Review), N.Y. Times,
July 27, 1986, (book review section) at 8, col. 3.
June 1987] 1643
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1641
promised to love, honor and respect the husband.' If either failed to fulfill his/
her promise, he/she was at fault and could be punished. If he was the one at
fault, alimony and other financial penalties were his lot. If she wronged him, she
would not be stoned (under our system), but she would forfeit her future
dowry.' Then along came "no-fault," which essentially prohibited society (at
least theoretically) from concerning itself with right or wrong and divided up the
community pot as nearly in half as possible, taking care of the dependent spouse
to the extent of need.
Weitzman initially accepts that analysis but then turns history on its head.
Finding fault with "no-fault" because, so she claims, women are now worse off
financially, 9 she argues that we should junk "fault"-but only for the purpose of
proving it. l1 Simply assume that the man has breached the contract, that he has
failed to love, honor, and support his spouse and, therefore, should pay for his
breach. In other words, it's a conclusive, irrebutable presumption that he is at
fault. Of course, in order to make this modem myth viable, it is also necessary
to assume-as a matter of law-that the wife is an innocent victim. She, too,
has earned her ticket aboard the Gravy Express, Unlimited.
In reality, that is not much different than the state of the law today--except
Weitzman would give the wife not merely an "E" ticket aboard the "railroad"
but insist the trip be expanded and be first class. Ironically, Weitzman frets that
with the arrival of "no-fault" women have allegedly been detrimentally affected.
She claims that the "rules" have been changed "in the middle of the game."
' "I
But it is hardly the middle of the game. And even if one makes all the far-
fetched assumptions Weitzman does, surely Weitzman is changing far more than
"no-fault." Indeed, when it comes to gamesmanship, she has no peer.
But, according to Weitzman, the husband has made an additional promise
from which he ought not be allowed to escape. He promised that when he got
married he would stay married and if he did not he would pay his love as though
he still were married. He made this promise even if his love was to be the one
who sought and fought to be divorced. Whoa, now. When did he ever make
such a promise? Patently, he did not make such a promise if he was in fact
innocent in the ensuing fracas. Moreover, even if he felt that should they
"split," he still never promised to do anything more than help to the extent of
demonstrable need within the confines of what society considered fair at the time
of marriage-and that certainly was not Weitzman's expansive concept of
"property." He made no promise-certainly absent fault-to give his "signifi-
cant other" a gilded, guaranteed, payable-on-demand insurance policy. That
platinum American Express card is Weitzman's invention.
7. WErrzMAN, supra note 2, at 2.
8. Id at 12.
9. Id at x, 73-76, 323-24.
10. Id at 382-83.
11. Id. at xiii. Weitzman later states, "it is simply not fair to change the rules... in the
last quarter of the game." Id. at 390.
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As amazing and radical as some of her proposals are, the fact is Weitzman,
to a far larger extent than she clearly admits, is seeking much in the way of
"reforms" on behalf of her sex that are already "on the books." Thus, in her
unique quest for equity, she would include "new" and expansive forms of prop-
erty. What are these "new forms" of property? She lists them as "career assets"
which include: "the major wage earner's salary, pension, medical insurance, ed-
ucation, license, the goodwill value of a business or profession, entitlements to
company goods and services, and future earning power." 12 In fact, with the
exception of the last item-the real zinger, "future earning power" (which is
Weitzman's unique contribution to her brave new world of property)-virtually
all these items now are part of the "pot" to be divided. This is certainly true in
California, 13 and by the author's own tables is likely true for well over half the
population nationwide (and growing).
1 4
Enigmatically, Weitzman considers as part of this plethora of new property,
as her first item, "the major wage earner's salary," assumably the husband's!
Aside from the ambiguity (never resolved) as to whether this is to be treated as
property or income (and it makes a great deal of difference), note that it inexpli-
cably does not include the wife's (non-major) salary. Moreover, Weitzman's
proposed methods for dividing the husband's pension fail, in many instances at
least, to consider tax factors. Thus, the end result will often be that the one-half
that the husband may be fortunate to get from the property division, can be
drastically reduced, even to nothing, while the wife may get her share (half or
more) of his pension tax-free. This is particularly true if Individual Retirement
Accounts, Keogh, or similar pension plans are involved and are not accorded
special treatment. In addition, Weitzman apparently would not consider the
fact that an older husband may be on the verge of retiring while a younger wife
(i.e., ex-wife) may have many more years before going to pasture. He now may
never be able to retire (or just die) and since she gets her share in hand, she is
doing just fine, thank you.
Weitzman makes this transfer from one spouse to the other sound relatively
simple; courts do it all the time, she insists. To some extent that is true. But in
domestic relations, that process alone, engaging experts and accountants, wit-
nesses and specialty lawyers, may be a bonanza for lawyers and other service
industries, but is often devastating, in costs alone, to one or both parties. Good-
will of a profession, for instance, as almost every lawyer knows, is a make-weight
for according the wife a greater share of her husband's potential wealth. In
practice, it is so speculative and arbitrary as to be the source of gallows humor
among bench and bar, and even the experts themselves laugh about it all the way
to the bank.
12. Id. at xiii; see also id. at 110-42.
13. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1986) (community property includes
contributions to education or training that substantially enhance the earning capacity of a
party).
14. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 424-29.
June 1987] 1645
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1641
Still another subject Weitzman treats with legerdemain in the area of "new
property" is when it (whatever "it" is) becomes part of the wife's divorce dowry.
Is all the husband's property subject to the wife's life-long lien? Suppose the
husband had his education, license, career, or goodwill prior to the marriage, did
they merge at the time of marriage? Does such a thing as separate property go
down the drain? Weitzman does recognize separability for pension purposes
(i.e., contributions determine division ratio), but in these murky areas such as
education, license, career, or goodwill, she leaves her position unclear. So, too,
is whether a short marriage is to have the same "rewards" as a long one. Is it
because her underlying aim is toward "equalizing the standards of living of the
two parties after divorce," as she insists?15
But the lollapalooza of her proposals is, that as a property right, the ex-wife
should share in the future earnings of her ex-husband. Though this is the princi-
pal thrust of her Financial Plan, and she refers to it hundreds of times through-
out her book, her in-depth analysis of the metes and bounds and mechanics of
this startling proposal is contained in less than two pages.16 That brief discus-
sion lends itself to only one sure thing within the courthouses-the legal com-
munity's guaranteed annual wage. Outside the courthouse the results are even
less promising.
Weitzman, however, treats these enormous problems with near indifference.
That is understandable if you begin with her assumptions and end up with her
goals. In between, however, you must accept the proposition that when a man
gets married he hands to his wife, literally and figuratively, a chattel mortgage
(in the full sense of both words) in virtually everything he owns or ever will own
for the rest of his life-even more so divorced than married.
But even Weitzman admits that aside from her radical proposal as to the
property right of future earnings, her other main proposals are already the law
in California (and elsewhere). Repeatedly, she states:
It is interesting to note that the new law guarantees, in theory,
support for three groups of women who are exempted from the new
standards of self-sufficiency: women with custody of young children,
women in need of transitional support, and older homemakers incapa-
ble of self-sufficiency. However, despite the law's guarantees, the new
legal norms are being applied to these women as well. Few of them are
awarded support.
1 7
How does she prove her assertion that these women are being denied what
the law accords them? Simple, judges are not doing their duty. 8 By implica-
tion, the lawyers for these women are selling them short (or engaging in mal-
practice.) The truth probably lies closer to the fact that Weitzman makes a
15. Id. at 390.
16. Id. at 139-41.
17. Id. at 34. Weitzman also observes that "the California wife can be certain that she will
receive half of the assets accumulated during the marriage .... " Id. at 91.
18. See id. at 395-400.
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quantum leap of cause and effect from her questionable statistics to the conclu-
sion that either "no-fault" causes lesser awards for women or that judges are not
enforcing the law. And why would judges do that? She does not say so directly,
though her followers have no qualms about pronouncing male chauvinism to be
the culprit. Thus, in an article explaining the cause for the property awards
discrepancy between husband and wife, the author, discussing and relying on
Weitzman's studies, states, "[tihe reason may be, in part, that the wife is still
often obliged by male judges to prove her entitlement to a share."'19
Weitzman implies the same. She says her findings were initially met with
skepticism by judges, "the overwhelming majority of judges who hear family law
cases are male.",20 But Weitzman supplies absolutely no evidence that the sex of
the judge has a significant effect upon the award. That may well be true, but it
could just as easily be discrimination against men as against women.
Throughout the study Weitzman frequently speaks of impoverished women
suffering from what she considers lopsided divorce awards. She is forced to ad-
mit, despite emphasis to the contrary, that the bulk of the cases in the divorce
courts involve little available property and quite often little income.2 1 In other
words, in most instances a change or enforcement of the law as Weitzman seeks
will have no practical effect on the wife's predicament.
Using the real downtrodden as a lever, Weitzman seeks to ameliorate the
plight of three particular groups of women: (1) older women with little work
experience; (2) mothers with minor children; and (3) women in transition, those
in their forties whose children are grown.2 2 Aside from the fact that these
groups encompass almost all wives, Weitzman wants them all to get full relief,
from the husband, of course. All of them should, it seems, share the same stan-
dard of living as their ex-spouses (or at least the ex-spouse with the greater
income).
Not doubting for a moment the sincerity of her concern for all groups of
women, it still seems she has a special concern for one group: women in their
forties, especially those who are in the highest economic bracket.23 These are
women whose children are grown, who themselves have been in the job market
and are able to remain in or return to the job market with relative ease. But they
probably cannot make as much as their husbands and, therefore, they will wit-
ness a reduction in their standard of living, particularly if their husbands are not
required to pay them stiff amounts in alimony and "new property."24
Many in this latter group, she admits, are relatively well-to-do women-
upper middle class, $40,000 or more pre-divorce family income (in the 1970s).
19. Blair, supra note 4, at 38.
20. WErrZMAN, supra note 2, at 396.
21. Id. at 55-69.
22. Id. at 184-214.
23. See id. at 330-36.
24. Id. at 380-82, 388-91.
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In fact, this group is heavily represented in Weitzman's data.25 More of these
well-to-do families are included than any other group. It seems likely that this
top-heavy data has unduly affected and colored the under-represented groups
and data results. Weitzman empathizes with these particular women because
after they get their divorces they encounter serious social problems. They can
no longer enjoy participation in activities that their social friends take for
granted. Moreover, their old social circles become narrower; they even lose
"status." 26 The winters are colder and the nights are longer than they imagined
they would be. Weitzman feels that these women must be helped. She rolls out
the same formula: make him pay and pay dearly. Her formula as applied to
these women might be aptly labeled, "The Beverly Hills Women's Security
Program."
The data Weitzman utilizes raises serious questions both as noted above
and by others. Moreover, it appears to exclude the tax consequences to the di-
vorced parties, which fall far heavier on the major wage earner. It also appears
that the analysis fails to adequately consider non-deductible but business-related
expenses (e.g., travel) that the husband primarily must defray, or other debts,
including attorney fees incurred in this and perhaps prior marriages. Moreover,
the data hardly seems to deal with the heavy inflationary factors involved in the
time span between the pre- and post-divorce periods.
The Michigan studies she cites are interesting.27 The first major finding
showed significant declines in the income of both divorced men and women. The
gap, when other factors are considered, may hardly be significant. Weitzman,
however, finds great support for her theses, she asserts, by the second major
finding, showing that the standard of living of divorced men seven years later
had risen and that of divorced women had significantly fallen.28 Weitzman's
own poll done in Los Angeles in 1978, comparing standard of living information
in a one-year period from the time of divorce, shows a differentiation considera-
bly greater than the Michigan study. Unfortunately, and significantly, this "sci-
entific" analysis was in Weitzman's phraseology, "Based on weighted sample of
interviews with divorced persons, Los Angeles County, California, 1978." 29
Presumably these "sample" interviews were conducted in large part by Weitz-
man from her already sparse pool of subjects. How many from these Beverly
Hills type families were utilized in arriving at living standards based upon the
"Lower Standard Budget" devised by the Bureau of Labor Statistics?
30
But aside from the accuracy or limited quantity of this questionable data,
25. Id. at 333.
26. Id. at 335.
27. See id. at 337.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 338.
30. Id. at 481 n.19. Weitzman's private study, resting upon such suspicious, scant, and
skewed data, has nonetheless been spouted nationwide; adherents of her philosophy and her
statistical conclusions have been cited as though they were the Holy Gospel. See, e.g., Cohen
& Hillman, Score 2 for Fairness In Divorce Courts, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1986, at 23, col. 4
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neither the Michigan nor Weitzman's own study leads to the point of her thesis,
to wit, that the "no-fault" legislation brought about a significant worsening of
women's plight and that the solution lies in the retribution (a.k.a. redistribution)
approach to a failed marriage: the non-faulting husband is nonetheless guilty.
In addition to this "guilt without fault" judgment, the concept of "property" is
to be expanded as far as the elastic will stretch so as to bring about "equity."
Weitzman from the very title of her book to the end of her brief warns of
the unintended consequences of even well-intentioned legislation. Indeed, she
actually emphasizes "that equality cannot be achieved by legislative fiat" in our
society.3 1 One may have thought this was her chief aim. Rather, she proposes
that a husband and wife be considered unequal and thereby end up equal. But
aside from that hat trick, it is clear that Weitzman seeks legislation to cure a
societal defect, a defect that she asserts was aggravated by the unintended conse-
quences of prior legislation which sought the same aim.
I submit Weitzman's proposals not only are totally without merit, plainly
illogical and blatantly unfair, but they will inevitably prove to be counterproduc-
tive. The unintended consequences are clear and certain.
First, the marriage institution, which I assume Weitzman favors, will lose
many future adherents. Why should a man marry when he must mortgage his
life to get out? Particularly in our day and age when everyone knows, as Weitz-
man notes, half of present marriages will fail.32 That, coupled with society's
perfect willingness to permit the foregoing of formal, legal marriages, will, given
the Weitzman Plan, result in a decline in marriage.
Second, the Weitzman Plan is so Draconian to men-married men-that
they will hardly jump at the idea of divorce. Thus, unhappy marriages and un-
happy children will multiply with all the social consequences.
Third, Weitzman and others are rightfully concerned about the slim
chances afforded women over thirty-five being able to find marriage partners.
The Weitzman Plan will reduce these women's marriage prospects from slim to
none.
Weitzman, of course, never for a moment concerned herself with the prob-
lem that men have now in divorce situations, let alone under the Weitzman
Plan. But Ms. Weitzman cannot ignore-and no one can play with-this star-
tling statistic: white men, particularly if they are divorced, have the highest
suicide rate, ten times that of women.33 Speaking of unintended consequences.
(national ed.) ("Property and maintenance agreements should reflect the fact that the largest
asset is often the earning ability of the breadwinner spouse.").
31. WErrZMAN, supra note 2, at 365.
32. Id at ix.
33. Gottschalk, Ending It All, Wall St. J., July 30, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
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